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L. C. Green* Trusteeship
and Canada's Indians
It has been suggested recently by some of those concerned with
putting forward claims on behalf of Canada's Indians that Canada
stands in the position of a trustee, and the contention has been made
that this relationship is not merely one of municipal concern, but
that the international trusteeship system extends to them.
In so far as the North American Indians are concerned, the idea of
trusteeship may be traced back to the comment of Chief Justice
Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia:1
[The Indians] are in a state of pupilage; their relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look
to the government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its
power...
Other United States Supreme Court judgments were to the same
effect. Ex parte Crow Dog2 concerned the interpretation of the
Treaty of 1868 with the Sioux, and its interconnection with Chapter
IV of Title XXVIII of the Revised Statutes entitled 'Government for
Indian Country.' Speaking for the Court, Justice Matthews stated
They were to be subjected to the laws of the United States not in
the sense of citizens but, as they had always been, as wards
subject to guardians; ... as a dependent community who were in
a state of pupilage...
The purpose of this 'wardship' may be seen in the comments of
Justice Miller in U.S. v. Kagama3:
The Indian tribes are the wards of the nation ... Because of local
ill-feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often
their deadliest enemies. From their very weaknesses and
helplessness .... there arises the duty of protection and with it
the power.
Clearly, therefore, the Supreme Court looked upon the tribes, not
the individuals who normally form the subject of guardian/ward
relationships, as being in a special capacity. The judges did not say
that the common law concept of this relationship governed the
*L. C. Green, University Professor, University of Alberta
1. 30U.S. 1 (1831) at 9.
2. 109U.S. 556 (1883) at560.
3. 118 U.S. 375 (1886) at 383.
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situation, for in the words of Marshall it merely 'resembled' it.
Moreover, the rights of a ward as against his guardian were, in the
normal way, protected through the medium of the courts. What later
commentators tend to overlook when having recourse to the
comments of the Chief Justice is that he went on to say:
... If it be true that the Cherokee Nation have rights, this is not
the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true
that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be
apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or
prevent the future.
Before proceeding further, one should point out the nature of the
guardian/ward relationship as understood in common law. Histori-
cally, the concept was part and parcel of the feudal relationship,
with the orphaned infant treated as an adjunct of his lands, 4 and the
idea of representation of the ward in, for example, judicial
proceedings came later, as did the idea that the guardian owed
obligations to the ward. It has been said, in fact, that5
the relationship of guardian and ward, at common law, is a
relation under which, typically, the guardian (a) has custody of
the ward's person and can decide where the ward is to reside, (b)
is required to educate and maintain the ward, out of the ward's
estate, (c) is authorized to manage the ward's property for the
benefit of the ward, (d) is precluded from profiting at the expense
of the ward's estate, or acquiring any interest therein, (e) is
responsible to the courts and to the ward, at such time as the ward
may become sui juris, for an accounting with respect to the
conduct of the guardianship.
In so far as the United States relation to the Indians was concerned,
this 'wardship' really indicated complete submission of the Indian
tribes to congressional jurisdiction, in return for which they enjoyed
protection, and, as was made clear in Calvin's Case6 , at common
law the concomitant of protection is allegiance and obedience. In so
far as the federal government of the United States is concerned, this
protection has primarily been exercised against state authorities in
accordance with constitutional law - a provision which finds
4. T. F. B. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (4th ed. London:
Butterworth, 1948) at 515; F. Pollick and F. Maitland, History of English Law (2d
ed. Cambridge: University Press. 1898) at 436-7.
5. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian Law, 1958, at 557, paraphrasing 1
Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation, and Domestic Relations (6th ed. 1921)
pt. IV.
6. (1608), 7 Co. Rep. la.; 77 E.R. 377 (K.B.).
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statutory parallel in s. 91 of the British North America Act. That, as
wards, the Indians have had no special rights independent of those
enjoyed by or conferred upon them by their guardian, is clear from
such United States decisions as Ex parte Webb. 7 where it was
pointed out that "although those tribes [the Five Civilized Tribes]
had long been treated more liberally than other Indians, they
remained none the less wards of the Government, and in all respects
subject to its control."
The extent of this subjection as it affects both United States and
Canadian Indians becomes clear from the words of the arbitral
award in the Cayuga Indians case 8 involving the rights of Cayugas
who had settled on the Canadian side of the border, in the light of
treaties entered into with that Nation by the State of New York
between 1789 and 1795 as well as the Treaty of Ghent between
Great Britain and the United States, 1814. After pointing out that
the tribe had never constituted a unit in the eyes of international law,
the tribunal indicated that it had always been treated as under the
protection of the power occupying its land, and that
the 'Cayuga Nation', with which the State of New York
contracted in 1789, 1790 and 1795, so far as it was a legal unit,
was a legal unit of New York law . . . [The 1789] treaty was
made at a time when New York had authority to make it, as
successor to the colony of New York and to the British Crown
. . . [while the Canadian Cayugas] were and are dependent upon
Great Britain, or later upon Canada, as the New York Cayugas
were dependent on and wards of New York.
As if to emphasise that the terms 'wards' was being used in the
loosest and most non-technical of senses, the tribunal held that as
the treaty was in the nature of a contract between New York and the
Cayugas and was within New York's competence, there was no
direct liability upon the United States. The latter was liable, not
because of the Indian treaties, but because of the Treaty of Ghent,
and its liability was not to the Indians, with whom the original
commitment had been made, but to their sovereign which, at its
discretion, could have decided to keep the $100,000 awarded for
itself and its National Debt purposes.
It is true that there are some decisions of the Supreme Court in
which the concept of wardship has been extended to individual
members of the tribe as well as to the tribe as a totality, as originally
7. 225 U.S. 663 (1912) at 684.
8. (1926), 6 U.N. Reports oflnternationalArbitralAwards at 173, 177 and 187.
Trusteeship and Canada's Indians 107
was the case. In these cases, too, however, it is clear that the
concept is used in a special sense that has nothing whatever to do
with the normal understanding of the legal relationship that exists
between a guardian and his ward. This is clear from the decision in
Elk v. Wilkins9 that
.. . the question whether any Indian tribes, or any members
thereof, have become so far advanced in civilization, that they
should be let out of a state of pupilage, . . . is a question to be
decided by the nation whose wards they are.
To a somewhat similar effect are two decisions of 1916 and 1917. In
U.S. v. Nice'0 the Supreme Court said:
Of course, when the Indians are prepared to exercise the
privileges and bear the burdens of one suijuris, the tribal relation
may be dissolved and the national guardianship brought to an
end, but it rests with Congress to determine when and how this
shall be done, and whether the emancipation shall at first be
complete or only partial. Citizenship is not incompatible with
tribal existence or continued guardianship, and so may be
conferred without completely emancipating the Indians or
placing them beyond the reach of congressional regulations
adopted for their protection.
Basing itself upon this decision, the Court in U.S. v. Waller" held:
The tribal Indians are wards of the Government, and as such
under its guardianship. It rests with Congress to determine the
time and extent of emancipation. Conferring citizenship is not
inconsistent with the continuation of such guardianship, for it has
been held that even after the Indians have been made citizens the
relation of guardian and ward for some purpose may continue.
On the other hand, Congress may relieve the Indians from such
guardianship and control, in whole or in part, and may, if it sees
fit clothe them with full rights and responsibilities concerning
their property or give them partial emancipation if it thinks that
course better for their protection.
One of the most popular arguments in favour of the wardship
concept has arisen from recognition by the courts that the 'treaties'
with the Indians 12 are the product of an unbalance in bargaining
power and might perhaps warrant interpretations that are somewhat
9. 112 U.S. 94 (1884) at 106 (italics added).
10. 241 U.S. 591 (1916) at 598.
11. 243 U.S. 452 (1917) at459-60.
12. For analysis of the nature of these treaties, see L. C. Green, Legal Significance
ofTreaties Affecting Canada's Indian (1972). 1 Anglo-Am L.R. 119.
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liberal on behalf of the Indians. This feeling clearly underlies the
comments of Matthews J. in Choctaw Nation v. U.S. 13:
The recognized relation between the parties to this controversy,
therefore, is that between a superior and an inferior, whereby the
latter is placed under the care and control of the former, and
which, while it authorizes the adoption on the part of the United
States of such policy as their own public interests may dictate,
recognizes, on the other hand, such an interpretation of their acts
and promises as justice and reason demand in all cases where
power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care
and protection.
The same principle of liberality has been applied when
interpreting acts of Congress in their application to the Indians, and
in Choate v. Trapp14 the Supreme Court departed from the rule of
strict statutory interpretation, pointing out that
• . . in the Government's dealings with the Indians the rule is
exactly the contrary. The construction, instead of being strict, is
liberal; doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favour
of the United States, are to be resolved in favour of a weak and
defenseless people, who are wards of the nation, and dependent
wholly upon its protection and good faith. This rule of
construction has been recognized, without exception, for more
than a hundred years and has been applied in tax cases
of which this was one.
While this more liberal approach towards both statutes and
treaties was confirmed, at least as regards taxation, in Squire v.
Capoeman'5, one must not overlook the comment of Justice Reed in
Northwestern Band of Shoshone Indians v. U.S. 16 in 1945:
We attempt to determine what the parties meant by the treaty. We
stop short of varying its terms to meet alleged injustices. Such
generosity, if any may be called for in the relations between the
United States and the Indians, is for the Congress.
It might be thought that undue attention has been paid to the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. It should be
remembered, however, that Chief Justice Marshall in the Cherokee
case was aware that the American title stemmed from the orginal
13. 119 U.S. 1 at 28. See also Jones v. Meehan 175 U.S. 1 (1898) at 11; and for
Canada, e.g. R. v. Syliboy, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307 at 314, and L. C. Green,
Canada's Indians: Federal Policy International and Constitutional Law (1970), 4
Ott. L.R. 101 at 11-4.
14. 224 U.S. 665 (1912) at 675.
15. 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
16. 324 U.S. 335 (1945) at 353.
Trusteeship and Canada's Indians 109
British title and thus it comes from the same stem as does that in
Canada, and this is true whether the word 'title' is used to describe
the rights of the state or of the Indians. Moreover, those who
currently discuss the claims of the Canadian Indians, particularly
when putting them forward in a form that has not previously been
used, do not hesitate to have recourse to the decisions of the
Supreme Court and the American situation generally 17 when
dealing with the Indians in the United States, even though the legal
regime there is in fact somewhat different, as reference to the
Government publication Federal Indian Law17a makes clear.
Further, Canadian judges themselves have on occasion not
hestitated to adopt the words of Marshall when construing the legal
rights of Canada's Indians. An outstanding instance of this is Norris
J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. White and
Bob'.
In leaving the issue of wards and guardians, we should bear in
mind the comment in Federal Indian Law19 that "it should be clear
that the use of the terms 'guardian' and 'ward' in these cases has no
necessary connection in the other senses in which the ward concept
has been used." If it is necessary to look for some comparable legal
concept which might be adopted by analogy it would be more
correct to look to the issue of minority protection as it is found in
such documents as the Constitution of India when dealing with, for
example, untouchables or linguistic groups20 .
Closely related to the concept of wardship is that of the trust, and
here too there is a proneness when talking of Indians to use technical
terms somewhat loosely. There is a tendency to forget the historical
origins of this relationship and its close connection with the law of
real property2 l , while the current concept of trust is a much more
recent development and depends on judicial interpretation and
statutory definition. This, however, has not prevented comment-
ators from using terms which would imply that a trust relationship
17. See, e.g., P. Cumming and N. Mickenberg, Native Rights in Canada, (2d. ed.
Toronto: General Pub. Co, 1972).
17a. Supra, note 5.
18. (1965), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 at 630 (B.C.C.A.), citing Johnson and Graham's
Lessee v. M,Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) at 589-90, 572-4.
19. Id at 566.
20. See, e.g., dicussion of Arts. 15-18, in H. Seervai, Constitutional Law of
India, (Bombay: N.M. Tripathic, 1068) ch. X.
21. Plucknett, supra, note 4, at 566: Pollick and Maitland, supra, note 4 at
228-39.
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exists between Indians and government and that there is, to all
intents and purposes, no difference between the guardian/ward
relationship and trusteeship. Thus in Seminole v. U.S. 22 the
Supreme Court of the United States stated dogmatically that the
United States "has charged itself with moral obligations of the
highest responsibility and trust. . . [which is in part] a humane and
self-imposed policy," but it should be noted that the Court referred to
it as only a moral obligation and, more usually, the attitude has been
not to use the word trust quite so openly, although the Indian
occupancy of tribal lands, for example, is frequently described 23 as
• . . sacred, . . . as sacred as the fee of the United States in the
same lands . . . 'But the right which the Indians held was only
that of occupancy. The fee was in the United States, subject to
the right, and could be transferred by them whenever they chose.
The grantee, it is true, would take only the naked fee, and could
only be interfered with or determined by the United States. It is to
be presumed that in this matter the United States would be
governed by such considerations of justice as would control a
Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent
race. Be that as it may, the propriety or justice of their action
towards the Indians with respect to their lands is a question of
governmental policy, . . '2A
Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been
exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has
always been deemed to be a political one, not subject to be
controlled by the judicial department of the government...
.. . When treaties were entered into between the United States
and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to
abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such
power might be availed of from considerations of governmental
policy, particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards
the Indians.
These comments concerning the right of occupancy remind one
of the attitude of the Privy Council in St. Catherine's Milling &
Lumber Co. v. The Queen25 that "the tenure of the Indians was a
personal and usufructuary right depending upon the goodwill of the
sovereign", and the reference to the political character of the
obligation is similar to the statements made by Taschereau J. in the
22. 316 U.S. 286 (1942) at 296-7.
23. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) at 564-6, re the
Treaty of Medicine Lodge, 1867.
24. CitingBeecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S., 517 (1877) at 525.
25. (1889), 14 App. Cas. 46 at55 (P.C.) (Can).
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same case when before the Supreme Court of Canada 26, while the
comments concerning good faith are reminiscent of those uttered by
McGillivray J.A. in R. v. Wesley 27 :
... In Canada the Indian treaties appear to have been judicially
interpreted as being mere promises and agreements ...
Assuming as I do that our treaties with Indians are on no higher
plane than other formal agreements yet this in no wise makes it
less the duty and obligation of the Crown to carry out the
promises contained in those treaties with the exactness which
honour and good conscience dictate, and it is not to be thought
that the Crown has departed from those equitable principles
which the Senate and the House of Commons declared in
addressing Her Majesty in 186728, uniformly governed the
British Crown in its dealings with the aborigines. . . . It is
satisfactory to be able to come to this conclusion and not to have
to decide that "the Queen's promises" have not been fulfilled. It
is satisfactory to think that the legislators have not so enacted but
the Indians may still [in the words of the Royal Proclamation of
176329] be "convinced of our justice and determined resolution
to remove all resonable causes of discontent".
Despite all the talk of 'trust' and the like, the comment of Justice
Douglas in U.S. v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co. 30 seems to sum up the
situation correctly, not only as it exists in the United States, but with
only verbal alteration as it exists in Canada too:
The manner, method and time of. . . extinguishment [of Indian
title] raise political, not justiciable, issues . . . As stated by Chief
Justice Marshall . . . the exclusive right of the United States to
extinguish Indian title has never been doubted. And whether it be
done by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise of
complete domination, adverse to the right of occupancy or
otherwise, its justness is not open to inquiry in the courts.
While it cannot be doubted that these judicial pronouncements
have been concerned with the rights of the Indians to equitable
treatment, it would appear that they have used such terms as equity,
fair dealing, good faith, and the like in a very general sense based
on moral judgement. It can hardly be said that they have recognized
26. (1887), 13S.C.R. 577 at 649.
27. [1932] 2 W.W.R. 337 at 351 and 353; [1932] 4 D.L.R. 774 at 788 and 790
(Alta. S.C.).
28. Re accession of Ruperts Land and Northwest Territories, R.S.C. 1970, App. II
No. 9, Sch. A.
29. R.S.C. 1970, App. H No. 1, (promising to preserve aboriginal rights and
protect Indian land interests).
30. 314 U.S. 339 (1941) at 347.
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any legal relationship in any way resembling that of a trust.
Nevertheless, Professor Reid Chambers in a paper submitted to a
sub-committee of the United States Senate Committee of the
Judiciary 3l has not hesitated to assert that "the United States stands
in a fiduciary relationship to Indians and Indian tribes." It is
submitted, however, that the evidence he adduces to support this
contention hardly serves this purpose, for he goes on to say
It has been held by the Supreme Court that 'Indian tribes are the
wards of the nation'. The duty is a 'self-imposed' one which
arises out of the Indian tribes' status as 'dependent domestic
nations' within the territory of the United States. The classic
discussion of the Government's fiduciary duty to Indian tribes is
found in Chief Justice Marshall's landmark decision of Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia32. In holding that Indian tribes are not 'foreign
states' entitled to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, the Chief Justice stated that 'the condition of the Indians in
relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other
two people in existence!'
Later Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed the special
guardianship of the Federal Government for Indians. In U.S. v.
Kagama33 the Court analyzed the fiduciary duty as growing out
of an 'exclusive sovereignty.. .which must exist in the National
Government' and the fact that Indian tribes are 'communities
dependent on the United States' . . . Most recently, in Seminole
v. U.S. 34, the Supreme Court held that the United States 'has
charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility
and trust'. This guardianship was referred to as in part 'a humane
and self-imposed policy'.
As if realizing that his judicial authorities do not really support the
case he is making, Professor Chambers has recourse to a
presidential statement - hardly a source of excessive worth from
the point of view of determining the legal status of a controversial
situation:
The existence of this trust relationship was recently reaffirmed by
President Nixon. In a message to Congress on July 8, 1970, he
emphasized that:
31. "Discharge of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Enforce Legal Claims of
Indian Tribes: Case Studies of Bureaucratic Conflict of Interest", 91st Cong. 2d
Sess. (Committee Print, 1970), Study of Administrative Conflicts of Interest in the
Protection of Indian Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (cited in M. Price, Law
and the American Indian (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1973) at 324-5.
32. 30U.S 1(1831).
33. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
34. 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
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'The United States Government acts as a legal trustee for the land
and water rights of American Indians. These rights are often of
critical economic importance to the Indian people; frequently
they are also the subject of extensive legal dispute.'
The President noted that many legal disputes concerning the
extent of the Indians' land and water rights are between them and
agencies of the federal government, their trustee. Such instances
involve conflicts of interest, as it is impossible for the
government vigorously to provide legal representation to the
Indians and, at the same time, effectively pursue its own designs
and policies with respect to land and water also claimed by the
Indians,
although in Canada we do find that the government is in fact helping
to finance the legal case that the Indians are seeking to assert against
the government in similar spheres.
While the American comments are of interest, care must be taken
not to overlook the fact that in some instances these may be affected
by the very nature of the United States Constitution, and to that
extent they are of course to be referred to only with the greatest of
caution by anyone interested in the problem from the point of view
of Canada's Indians, although, as has been pointed out, it is by no
means unknown for Canadian courts to refer to the decisions of their
southern neighbour in this context. But apart from those already
mentioned, there have been others in which the language of equity
has been used, with implications that there exists a true
guardian/ward or trust relationship. It is necessary, therefore, to
examine some of these a little more closely, bearing in mind
constantly the warning of Taschereau J. in the St. Catherine case to
which reference has already been made, namely that respect for the
claims of the Indians lies "not because of any legal obligation...
but as a sacred political obligation, in the execution of which the
State must be free from judicial control. "35
To some extent the Canadian courts have taken as their starting
point the comment of Lord Shelbourne in Kinlock v. Secretary of
State for India36 in which he recognized that the words
. . . 'in trust for' are quite consistent with, and indeed are the
proper manner of expressing every species of trust - a trust not
only as regards those matters which are the proper subjects for an
equitable jurisdiction to administer, but as regards higher
35. St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 at
649.
36. (1882), 7 App. Cas. 649( (H.L.).
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matters, such as might take place between the Crown and public
officers discharging, under the directions of the Crown, duties or
functions belonging to the prerogative and to the authority of the
Crown. In the lower sense they are matters within the jurisdiction
of, and to be administered by the ordinary Courts of Equity: in
the higher sense they are not.
Nevertheless, it is possible for the Crown to become trustee in the
full sense of the word - "There is nothing.. .to prevent the Crown
from acting as agent or trustee if it chooses deliberately to do so' ' 37.
Although difficulties may arise with regard to enforcement, "it is
laid down by highest authority that by a Petition of Right [- today
it would be necessary to file other documents rather than to resort to
this procedure -] a trust ... may be enforced against the Crown" 38 ,
provided of course that a trust does in fact exist, and "I do not think
that the Crown can be placed in the position of trustee by
implication; the Crown can only be constituted trustee by express
provisions of an Act of Parliament or a contract to which the Crown
is a party" 39. To some extent, as in the American cases, when
dealing with Indians the courts in Canada, and those using their
decisions for partisan purposes, have presumed the existence of a
trust from general statements, especially when these have been
expressed in highsounding moralistic terms.
One of the earliest cases that has been acclaimed as postulating a
trust on behalf of the Canadian Indians is Ontario v. Canada and
Quebec, In re Indian Claims40 . This concerned the liability of the
provinces and the government of Canada in respect of certain debts
and other commitments and involved consideration of treaties
affecting Indians in the Lake Superior and Lake Huron districts.
Before the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada it had gone
before an arbitration board and the award of Mr. Chancellor Boyd
referred to some of the cases decided in the United States Supreme
Court and called for a liberal interpretation of the treaties with the
Indians. He seems, however, to have been somewhat confused as to
the nature of the Indian tribes and of the treaties in question, for he
appears to have assumed that the former possessed full treaty-
making capacity and that the latter were treaties in the international
sense 41:
37. Civilian War Claimants, Association v. The King, [1932] A.C. 14 at 37.
38. Canadian Central Railway v. The Queen (1873), 20 Gr. Ch.R 273 at 290.
39. Chapman v. The King, [1934]Ex. C.R. 152 at 159.
40. (1896), 25 S.C.R. 434.
41. Green, supra, note 12.
Trusteeship and Canada's Indians 115
The course of construction applicable both to constitutional Act
and Indian Treaty is not that a literal and strict meaning be given
to the words, but that they shall be construed liberally and
comprehensively so as to further the reasonable scope of the
provisions. This benignant construction obtains with added force
in the construction of a treaty wherein the rules of international
rather than of municipal law are to be regarded.
Now in these transactions with the aborigines from the earliest
colonial times in North America the Government has assumed the
status of the Indian tribes to be that of distinct political
communities. When the dealing has been by the Crown for the
cession of territory over which some legal possessory right by the
tribes in actual occupation has always been recognized, then the
form of the transactions has been that of a treaty. Superadded to
this, it is to be taken into account that the Indians relatively to the
whites are in a state of dependency or pupilage, and that the
nearest legal analogy as to the relationship between their tribes
and the Government is that of guardian and ward.
Hence arises the doctrine well established in American
jurisprudence, and dating from the era of British colonization,
that treaty stipulations are to be carried out with the utmost
plenitude of good faith and with even generous interpretation in
favour of these public wards of the nations ...
The rules to be applied are those which govern public treaties,
which even in the case of controversies between nations equally
independent are not to be read as rigidly as documents between
persons governed by a system of technical law, but in the light of
that larger sense which constitutes the spirit of the Law of
Nations.
In the Supreme Court,42 only Gwynne J. was prepared to
recognize the existence of a trust, but his judgment was by way of
dissent and even he was not prepared to assert that the Crown was
legally bound 43:
The terms and conditions expressed in those instruments
[treaties] as to be performed by or on behalf of the Crown have
always been regarded as involving a trust graciously assumed by
the Crown to the fulfilment of which with the Indians the faith
and honour of the Crown is pledged, and which trust has always
been most faithfully fulfilled as a treaty obligation of the Crown.
Among the majority, Strong C.J. was emphatic in holding that there
was "no ground for saying that there was any express charge, lien
42. Supra, note 40.
43. Id. at511-2.
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or trust" 44 . In fact, the case was decided almost as an
interprovincial dispute, so that most of the remarks concerning
Indian rights and the significance of the treaties were in fact obiter.
Nevertheless, Sedgewick J.'s comments are significant 45:
Do these treaties as they are called in law create a burden upon or
give to the Indians an interest in the land they purport to
cede? ...
The wards of the nation must have the fullest benefit of every
doubt. But I do not see that where the question is solely between
the two provinces these high ethical doctrines should have a
weight. It is one thing from motives of grace or from a sense of
moral obligation to do more than justice to the Indian races. It is
quite another thing in the construction of a legal instrument to
give weight to these motives in favour of one province at the
expense of another, especially when these races in no way benefit
thereby ....
The only security in the treaty [for annuities] was the personal
covenant of the Sovereign. . . . I cannot bring myself to think
that it was ever within the contemplation of the parties that as
security for payment the Indians were to have a charge upon the
ceded lands.
Other cases which have used somewhat loose language from the
law of trusts have been invoked to support the trusteeship concept
on behalf of Canada's Indians. There can be little doubt as to the
correctness of the comment of Macdonald J.A. in his dissenting
judgment in R. v. Morley46 that the "reservation of federal
jurisdiction in respect to Indians and Indian lands reserved for
Indians [in s.91 of the British North America Act], has a definite
object in view, viz., safeguarding the rights and privileges of the
wards of the Dominion at all times", and this was confirmed in
wider terms by McArther Co. Ct.J., Nova Scotia, inRe Kane47:
For reasons which are quite apparent, the Indian has been placed
under the guardianship of the Dominion Government. He is its
ward, so long as he remains unenfranchised48, and the Minister
... is given the control and management of all lands and
property of Indians in Canada. They are looked upon and treated
as requiring the friendly care and directing hand of the
44. Id. at 503.
45. Id. at 533, 535 and 537-8.
46. [193214 D.L.R. 483 at 513; [193212 W.W.R. 193 at 218 (B.C.C.A.).
47. [1940]1 D.L.R. 390 at397. (N.S. Cty. Ct.).
48. Enfranchisement is regulated by ss. 109 - 13 of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c.I-6.
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Government in the management of their affairs. They and their
property are, so to speak, under the protecting hand of the
Dominion Government...
A fairly recent case in the Supreme Court indicates that the facts
may be such that a trust is created, although on the major issues the
matter was referred back to the lower court because of insufficient
evidence. In Miller v. The King 49, Kellock J. having referred to the
comment by Lord Atkin in the Civilian War Claimants case 50 that
the Crown could deliberately choose to be a trustee, drew attention
to the rival contentions which make clear what the Crown's views
generally are:
[I]t is also alleged by the petition that the Department of Indian
Affairs from its formation in 1784 to the present time is an
express trustee of the lands and property of the Indians, including
all Indian money paid to it.... On behalf of the respondent it is
... said that reference to the Crown (presumably in documents
or statutes) as trustee for the Indians and to the Indians as wards
of His Majesty is not a technical use of such terms but such
references are merely descriptive of the general political
relationship between His Majesty and the Indians. It is also
contended that only fact relied upon to show a trust or agreement
is the acceptance ... of the surrender of the Indian lands...
[However,] I see no more difficulty in the present instance,
should the facts warrant, -in making a declaration that the monies
in the hands of the Crown are trust monies and that the appellant
and those upon whose behalf he sues are cestuis que trust, even
although the court could not direct the Crown to pay. In this latter
event it is inconceivable that ... the Crown, as the fountain of
justice, would not do justice. I think, however, no such difficulty
lies in the way of an order for payment
and one claim was conceded. Lest it be considered that the Supreme
Court is here asserting that the relationship between the Indians and
the Crown always constitutes that of trusteeship, it is as well to refer
to the Supreme Court's decision in St. Ann's Shooting and Fishing
Club v. The King5 ' in the same year, in which Rand J. stated
The language of the statute [in question] embodies the accepted
view that these aborigines are, in effect, wards of the State,
whose care and welfare are a political trust of the highest
obligation.
It would help if one knew what is meant by " a political trust of
49. [1950] S.C.R. 168 at 174 and 177-8: [1950] 1 D.L.R. 513 at 518 and 521.
50. [1932]A.C. 14. at 37.
51. [1950] S.C.R. 211 at 219; [195012 D.L.R. 225 at 232.
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the highest obligation", especially as Prime Minister Trudeau in
explaining his Government's White Paper on Indian Policy 52 said of
Canadian policy towards the Indian53:
We have set the Indians apart as a race. We've set them apart in
our laws. We've set them apart in the ways the governments will
deal with them. They're not citizens of the provinces as the rest
of us are. They are wards of the federal government. They get
their services from the federal government rather than from the
provincial or municipal governments. They have been set apart in
law. They have been set apart in the relations with government
and they've been set apart socially too.
The White Paper too is no help in explaining this 'political trust of
the highest obligation.' It informs us that
The treatment resulting from their different status has been often
worse, sometimes equal and occasionally better than accorded to
their fellow citizens. . . . Many Indians ... suffer from poverty.
The discrimination which affects the poor, Indian and non-Indian
alike, when compounded with a legal status that sets the Indian
apart, provides dangerously fertile ground for social and cultural
discrimination. . . .The legal and administrative discrimination
in the treatment of Indian people has not given them an equal
chance of success. It has exposed them to discrimination in the
broadest and worst sense of the term - a discrimination that has
profoundly affected their confidence that success can be theirs.
Discrimination breeds discrimination by example, and the
separateness of Indian people has affected the attitudes of other
Canadians towards them.
There are few Canadians, Indian or non-Indian, who would be
prepared to disagree with this summation of past Canadian policy
and attitudes. That being so, it is hardly possible to regard the
relation between the Government and the Indians as one based on
trusteeship, whether it be legal or political in character - unless of
course the words ward and guardian and trust are to lack all meaning
- legal, equitable, or moral.
Recent events concerning the dissolution of empire and emphasis
upon the right of self-determination 54 for what are described as
52. Dept. of Indian Aff., Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian
Policy, 1969.
53. Speech at Vancouver, 8 Aug. 1969. See Cumming & Mickenberg, supra, note
17, App VI.
54. See e.g., debate at 1971 Conference of American Society of International Law
on "Self-Determination and Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict", 65
Proceedings at 3 1ff.
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non-self-governing peoples, culminating in the United Nations
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples 55 and the affirmation that "all peoples have the right of
self-determination" in Article 1 of the International Covenants on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political
Rights, 196656, have led various movements among minority
groups and indigenous peoples to claim for themselves a right to
independence or autonomy. In fact, on occasion, as with the
occupation of Alcatraz in San Francisco Bay and Wounded Knee by
the American Indian Movement, attempts have been made to
declare parts of the United States independent Indian territories.
Before considering the significance for such aboriginal peoples as
the Indians of these international instruments, it may be useful to
look at the extent to which the Crown became a trustee for its people
as a result of bilateral international agreements or by virtue of
treaties made with such peoples.
It is only possible to deal with a representative selection of the
cases which have arisen out of claims that the Crown has become a
trustee for its citizens as a result of such treaty arrangements, but
they serve to illustrate what the municipal decisions have already
shown, namely, that the Crown does not become a trustee by
implication. Moreover, in these cases there is the further factor to be
borne in mind that in so far as international law is concerned the
Crown acts for the state and not for the inhabitants and any burden
or benefit flowing from the treaty is borne by the Crown. From the
point of view of the citizens such an agreement is res inter alios acta
and since they are not parties to it they are incapable of being
directly affected thereby, unless special arrangements are made
involving, for example, a unilateral undertaking by the Crown to
confer any benefits upon citizens, which may be done by way of the
establishment of a special claims tribunal. Any such arrangement,
however, is purely a matter of municipal law.
One of the earliest cases that raised this problem was that of
Baron de Bode57 arising from the provisions in the Treaties of Paris,
1814 and 181558, whereby British subjects whose property had been
'unduly' confiscated by the French authorities were to receive
55. G. A. Res 1514 (XV) 1960.
56. Annexed to G. A. Res. 2200 (XXI).
57. (1845), 8 Q.B. 208; 15 E.R. 854 and (1847), 13 Q.B. 364; 16 E.R. 1302.
58. 63 Parry, Consolidated Treaty Series (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications,
1969) at 172; 65 id. at 251.
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compensation. The court took the line that any money received by
the Crown under the treaty described as for the purpose of
compensating British subjects was in fact available for any purpose
that Parliament might decide. It was held, further, that if any
obligation had been imposed upon the Crown, breach of such an
obligation would amount to a tort, and, since at that time the Crown
could not be sued in tort, the position of the claimant would, from a
practical point of view, be more or less the same. This decision is
similar to those Canadian decisions which pointed out that there was
no means of enforcing an equitable obligation against the Crown
even if such did subsist; or to those United States decisions which
emphasized that rights under the treaties with the Indians were for
political rather than judicial protection.
Of major significance in this connection are the comments of
Cockburn C. J. in Rustomjee v. The Queen59 concerning monies
paid by China in respect of debts owed to British subjects. It was
received
for Her Majesty at her discretion to cause such distribution of it to
be made as shall make good the claims which her subjects have
against the foreigner from whose government the money is
received. In such a case a petition of right will not lie. The notion
that the Queen of this country, in receiving a sum of money in
order to do justice to some of her subjects, to whom injustice
would otherwise be done, becomes the agent of those subjects,
seems to me really too wild a notion to require a single word of
observation beyond that of emphatically condemning it. In like
manner, to say that the sovereign becomes the trustee for subjects
on whose behalf money has been received by the Crown, appears
to be equally untenable.
Lush J. was equally horrified at the suggestion 60 :
The relation which is pressed upon us here never existed in this
case between the Crown and the subject, and it is one which
cannot exist in any state like ours 61 between the sovereign and
the subject.
As has already been indicated, the Crown can in certain
circumstances be a trustee for some of its subjects, and this was
pointed out in the Court of Appeal by Lord Coleridge C.J.6 2:
59. (1876), 1 Q.B.D. 487 at 492-3.
60. Id. at497.
61. See, e.g., In re Schiff, [1921] 1 Ch. 149 at 156-7 and Administrator of German
Property v. Knoop, [1933] Ch. 439.
62. (1876),2Q.B.D. 69at74(C.A.).
Trusteeship and Canada's Indians 121
We do not say that under no circumstances can the Crown be a
trustee; we do not even say that under no circumstances can the
Crown be an agent; but it seems clear to us that in all that relates
to the making and performance of a treaty with another sovereign
the Crown is not, and cannot be, either a trustee or an agent for
any subject whatever. We do not, indeed, doubt that, on the
payment of the money by the Emperor of China, there was a duty
on the part of the English Sovereign to administer the money so
received according to the stipulations of the treaty. But it was a
duty to her subjects according to the advice of her responsible
ministers; not the duty of an agent to a principal, or of a trustee to
a cestui que trust.
This tendency to look to the greater good of the entire nation
rather than to concede a trust relationship between the Crown and
some of its subjects was the basis of the decision of the Privy
Council in Canada v. Ontario6 3 in which it was held that though the
treaty of 1873 with the Salteaux of the Ojibwas64 was of direct
advantage to the province, the Dominion in making the treaty was
not acting as agent or trustee of the province, but with a view to
great national interests:
The Dominion Government was indeed, on behalf of the Crown,
guardian of the Indian interest, and empowered to make a
surrender of it and give equivalents in return, but in so doing they
were not under any special duty to the province. And in regard to
the proprietary rights in the land (apart from the Indian interest)
which through the Crown enured to the benefit of the province,
the Dominion Government had no share in it at all. The only
thing in which the Dominion could conceivably be thought
trustees for the province, namely, the dealing with the Indian
interest, was a thing concerning the whole Canadian nation. In
truth, the duty of the Dominion Government was not that of
trustees, but that of ministers exercising their powers and their
discretion for the public welfare.
One of the most important of these cases, and one which was
cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Miller v.
The King65 is Civilian War Claimants, Association v. The King66 in
which it was alleged that the Crown had received reparations from
Germany in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles as trustee for
63. [1910]A.C. 637 at 646. (P.C.) (Can).
64. Treaty No.3 in 1 Canada: Indian Treaties and Surrenders (Coles: Toronto,
1971) at 303. (This is a reprint of the three volumes published by the Queen's
Printer in 1891).
65. [1950]S.C.R. 168; [195031 D. L.R. 513.
66. [1932]A.C. 14at24.
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those nationals who had suffered injury during the war. Lord
Buckmaster said:
I can see no evidence whatever of an acceptance of trusteeship on
the part of the Government, or assertion of trusteeship on the part
of the people who suffered damage, nor anything up to the time
when the money was received to show that the conception of
trusteeship was in the minds of anyone in any form whatever.
Indeed, the original statements that were made were made of the
readiness to compensate out of the national funds at home, and
nobody suggests that the Government were the trustees of those
funds for this purpose.
Finally, when the moneys were received, it was said that from
and after that moment the Crown became a trustee .... If that
were the case, unless you are going to limit the rights which the
beneficiaries enjoy, those rights might include among other
things, a claim for an account of the moneys that were received,
of the expenses incurred, and the way in which the moneys have
been distributed. Such a claim presented against the Crown...
would certainly have no precedent, and would . . . invade an
area which is properly that belonging to the House of Commons.
That money was received by the Crown as agent seems to me can
no more be established than that the money was received by it as
trustee. In fact, the trusteeship is the agency stated in other
words. If the Crown was not a trustee, neither was it an agent; nor
can I see that in any sense the Crown received these moneys as
money had and received to the use of the people whose claims
were made. The people whose claims were made were not
considered by Germany on making the payment at all. The terms
of the treaty were that Germany should pay the sum necessary to
satisfy the claims of various people who had suffered, and it was
left to the Governments themselves, as between them and their
nationals to determine how the money was to be distributed.
It might be suggested that since these cases refer to treaties
between the Crown and a foreign sovereign they are not strictly in
point when looking at the situation of the Indians. On the other
hand, if, as the Indians have been inclined to contend particularly
with increasing emphasis in recent years, their 'treaties' are in fact
treaties in the full international sense of that term, then they would
clearly be relevant, although it must be accepted that they concern
claims on behalf of nationals of the Crown and not on behalf of
nationals of the other party. In the case of the Indians the situation is
complicated by virtue of the fact that the alleged cestuis que trust are
simultaneously nationals of the Crown and are the other
treaty-making party. From this point of view the case of Hoani Te
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Heuheu v. Aotea District Maori Land Board6 7 may be more
significant, especially as there is a growing tendency for North
American Indians to insist that their treaties were in fact 'peace'
treaties. The case in issue turned on the allegation that s.14 of the
New Zealand Native Purposes Act, 1935, was ultra vires the
legislature of New Zealand inasmuch as it derogated from the rights
conferred upon the Native owners by the Treaty of Waitangi,
184068, ending the Maori War and under which the Maori people
surrended their sovereignty to the British crown. In its terms, the
Treaty was very similar to the phraseology of the Royal
Proclamation of 1763, which has been described as the Indians' Bill
of Rights69:
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to
the chiefs and tribes of New Zealand, and to the respective
families and individuals thereof, the full exclusive and
undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests,
fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or
individually possess, so long as it is their wish and desire to retain
the same in their possession; but the chiefs of the United Tribes
and the individual chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right
of pre-emption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be
disposed to alienate, at such prices as may be agreed upon
between the prospective proprietors and persons appointed by
Her Majesty to treat with them in that behalf.
Speaking on behalf of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
Viscount Simon L. C. said:
Under Article 1 there had been a complete cession of all rights
and powers of sovereignty of the chiefs. It is well settled that any
rights purporting to be conferred by such a treaty of cession
cannot be enforced in the courts, except in so far as they have
been incorporated in the municipal law. The principle laid down
in a series of decisions was summarized ... in Vajesingji
Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India70 .. .: 'When a
territory is acquired by a sovereign for the first time that is an act
of state. It matters not how the acquisition has been brought
about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on
treaty, it may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied
by a recognized ruler. In all cases the result is the same. Any
inhabitant of the territory can make good in the courts established
by the new sovereign only such rights as the sovereign has,
67. [1941] A.C. 308 at 324-7 (P.C.) (N.Z.).
68. B.S.F.P. 1840-41,at 111.
69. St. Catherine's Case (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 at 652 (per Gwynne J.).
70. (1924), L.R. 51 Ind. App. 357 at 360 (P.C.).
124 The Dalhousie Law Journal
through his officers, recognized. Such rights as he had under the
rule of predecessors avail him nothing. Nay more, even if in a
treaty of cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants should
enjoy certain rights, that does not give a title to those inhabitants
to enforce these stipulations in the municipal courts ... '
So far as the appellant invokes the assistance of the court it is
clear that he cannot rest his claim on the Treaty of Waitangi, and
that he must refer the court to some statutory recognition of the
right claimed by him. He, therefore, refers to the New Zealand
Constitution Act, 1852, under which representative government
was conferred upon New Zealand. . . . [By s. 73] 'It shall not be
lawful for any person other than Her Majesty, her heirs or
successors, to purchase or in anywise acquire or accept from the
aboriginal natives land of or belonging to or used or occupied by
them in common as tribes or communities, or to accept any
release or extinguishment of the rights of such aboriginal natives
in any such land as aforesaid; and no conveyance or transfer, or
agreement for the conveyance or transfer of any such land, either
in perpetuity or any term or period, either absolutely or
conditionally, and either in property or by way of lease or
occupancy, and no such release or extinguishment as aforesaid,
shall be of any validity or effect unless the same be made to, or
entered into with, and accepted by Her Majesty, her heirs or
successors...
The appellant's contention was that the right conferred by the
Waitangi Treaty was made a substantive part of the municipal
law by s. 73 of this Act, but he had to concede that the Imperial
Parliament, by virtue of its sovereign power of legislation, might
have altered any right recognized or conferred by s. 73 . . . In
view of this admission . . . the only ground left on which the
appellant can challenge the validity of s. 14 is that the Imperial
Parliament has not conferred on the New Zealand Legislature the
power to alter s. 73 . . . But this ground also fails [since later
Imperial legislation has expressly conferred that power]...
If then . . . the Imperial Parliament has conferred on the New
Zealand legislature power to legislate with regard to native lands,
it necessarily follows that the New Zealand legislature has the
same power as the Imperial Parliament had to alter and amend its
legislation at any time .... As regards the appellant's argument
that the New Zealand legislature has recognized and adopted the
Treaty of Waitangi as part of the municipal law of New Zealand,
it is true that there have been references to the treaty in the
statutes, but these appear to have invariably had reference to
further legislation in relation to the native lands, and, in any
event, even the statutory incorporation of... the treaty in the
municipal law would not deprive the legislature of its power to
alter or amend such a statute by later enactments...
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There is much in this extract which clearly applies to the treaties
of the Indians in North America, and especially is it relevant to the
position and rights of those in Canada. As Viscount Simon pointed
out, legislation can give effect to treaty provisions and to the extent
that it does so the beneficiaries of the treaty clauses in question will
have their rights protected. But this protection flows not from the
treaty, but from the legislation, Moreover, such legislation may
well create a legally enforceable trust relationship, as has the Indian
Act itself in certain fields for Canada's treaty and registered
Indians71. Nevertheless, this Act enjoys no greater status than any
other act and may be repealed at any time parliament may so decide,
and with the repeal of the Act any trusts created under it would
equally terminate, for the statutory basis of their existence would
have disappeared.
It is clear from what has been said that, save in so far as express
statutory action has resulted in the creation of a trust relationship,
there is no such relation between the Crown or the government and
the Indians, no matter what terms indicating such a relationship, or
that of guardian and ward or some other form of pupilage, may have
been employed by courts or government leaders. It becomes
necessary, therefore, to see whether any such commitment of a
trusteeship character has been created on the international level. The
first thing that must be pointed out is that the position of the Indians
in North America, whether in the United States or in Canada, has
nothing in common with that of the aboriginal population of colonial
territories. Unlike British settlement in Africa, Malaya and the like,
the North American colonies developed into the independent states
of the United States and of Canada and the government of those
countries are regarded as governing the entire geographic limits of
their territorial empires, and the inhabitants, regardless of their
colour or racial origin, are today regarded as citizens. Similar
conditions prevail in Australia and New Zealand. In Africa, on the
other hand, the settlers, except in South Africa and Rhodesia, never
regarded themselves as permanent inhabitants and looked upon their
stay as a temporary interlude until such time, perhaps somewhat
remote, as the native inhabitants would be able to govern
themselves. As a result, Lord Lugard's concept 72 that "Europe is in
71. To benefit from the Act, registration in accordance with ss. 5-12 is necessary.
72. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (5th ed. London: Frank Cass,
1965) (Original publication: 1922).
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Africa for the mutual benefit for her own industrial classes and of
the native races in their progress to a higher plane, that the benefit
can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civil
administration to fulfill this dual mandate" never applied to those
British possessions wherein the white settlers eventually achieved
the right of independent government, even though there have been
constant references by politicians and judges alike to the civilizing
mission of the white man and his desire to improve the lot of the
aboriginal inhabitants. A typical statement to this effect is to be
found in the Canadian Government's Policy Statement on the
Indians issued in 196973.
The concept of agency or ward and guardian became fairly
significant on the international level after the First World War with
the introduction of the mandate system under Article 22 of the
League of Nations Covenant, wherein we find the clear assertion of
there being 'a sacred trust of civilisation' in so far as the well-being
and development of the local inhabitants are concerned. Although
not expressed in quite the same terms, the provisions in the Article
concerning limitations upon the military uses of the area and the
commitment to the 'open door' were reminiscent of the second
portion of Lugard's concept. He had cited with approval Joseph
Chamberlain's view that the colonial powers were in Africa as
"trustees of civilisation for the commerce of the world" and
summed up the role of the colonial power to be a "trustee, on the
one hand, for the advancement of the subject races, and on the other
hand, for the development of its natural resources for the benefit of
mankind." 7
4
Despite the glowing references to trusteeship and the need to
assist non-self-governing peoples towards independence, the
historic background to the adoption of Article 22 of the Covenant
indicates that there was no intention to apply this system on a
universal scale or in a unilateral fashion solely on behalf of the local
inhabitants. "t To a great extent, the system was a result of an
unwillingness on the part of Great Britain to enlarge its empire, of a
desire to bring the United States into the administration sphere, a
fear on the part of some self-governing dominions of having
73. Supra, note 62.
74. Supra, note 72 at 60 and 606.
75. See, e.g., D. Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, (London: V.
Gollanez Ltd. 1938) at 114ff and 514ff.
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German rule return to neighbouring territories, and rejection of the
possibility of a revival of the grab for Africa, together with
recognition of the truth of the warning delivered by Sir Robert
Borden, the Canadian Premier, that76
it would create a very bad impression if the British Empire came
out of this war with a great acquisition of territory, and if the
United States undertook no new responsibilities. If America were
to go away from the Conference with her share of guardianship, it
would have a great effect on the world. . . If the chief result of
this war was a scramble for territory by the Allied nations, it
would be merely a prelude to further wars.
The most significant feature of the mandate system, perhaps even
more important than the substantive content of the system with its
belief in 'tutelage' and the like, is the fact that it was only limited in
its scope. It was not intended to have any effect in the colonial
territories of the existing empires, however much it might be hoped
that its broad outlines might serve as an example. As the opening
paragraph of Article 22 made clear, it would only apply to colonial
territories which formerly belonged to the Central Powers:
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the
late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by
peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples
form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
To give effect to this 'sacred trust' the mandates treaties were drawn
up, but the principles that they embodied were only applicable to
each territory to which the particular treaty applied, although the
practice of the Permanent Mandates Commission served to create
certain broad principles of general application for the interpretation
of those treaties.
What is quite clear and cannot be doubted is that at no time was
the mandate system intended to apply to the colonial territories of
the members of the League of Nations. Even less was it relevant in
so far as the interests and rights of indigenous communities within
self-governing states or dominions were concerned. For some of
these communities the minorities system was introduced 77, and
76. Id. at 116 and 121.
77. See, e.g., L. C. Green, "The Protection of Minorities in theLeague of Nations
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although there developed a tendency to talk of minority protection
and rights this was only true in respect of any group that was
protected by a specific treaty or, as in the case of the Greek
community in Albania78, some other undertaking which created
legal obligations. The minorities in question were national groups
whose racial, cultural and other characteristics differed from those
of the surrounding majority because they lived in multiracial states.
As regards other states, which might have been described as
multiracial, such as the United Kingdom, France, Canada, the
United States or India, the system was as irrelevent as was the
mandate system.
With the end of the Second World War a new dimension
appeared with regard to independence. The Charter of the United
Nations proclaimed as one of its Purposes the development of
"friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples", although it
nowhere defined what it meant by either 'self-determination' or the
'peoples' who were to enjoy such a right. However, the Charter
does contain in Chapter XI a Declaration regarding Non-Self-
Governing Territories, and in Chapter XII it introduces an
international trusteeship system the aims of which are, broadly
speaking, similar to those of the mandate system. In so far as the
trusteeship system is concerned, while its basic objectives are
(a) to further international peace and security;
(b) to promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and
their progressive development towards self-government or
independence as may be appropriate to the particular
circumstances of each territory and its people and the freely
expressed wishes of the people concerned, and as may be
provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
(c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the
interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
(d) to ensure equal treatment in social, economic and
commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations
and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in
the administration of justice [- shades of Chamberlain and
and the United Nations", in A. Gotlieb, Human Rights, Federalism and Minorities
(Toronto: Canadian Inst. of International Affairs, 1970) at 180, and literature cited
therein.
78. E.g., Minority Schools inAlbania (1935), P.C.I.J. Ser. AB/64.
Trusteeship and Canada's Indians 129
Lugard -]78a, without prejudice to the attainment of the
foregoing objectives...
the system is only to apply to those territories which are expressly
placed under it. By Article 77 of the Charter the territories which
may be placed under trusteeship are
(a) territories now held under mandate;
(b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a
result of the Second World War; and
(c) territories placed under the system by States responsible for
their administration.
It is obvious that the trusteeship system had no automatic
application to any territory and that it was not intended or expected
that it would be extended to any part of an existing state, although
there was some hope, which never materialised, that it might make
a contribution to the end of colonialism, with administrators placing
their own colonial territories within the purview of the system.
Any attempt to extend the concept of the trusteeship system
beyond the limits envisaged for it - and the system is in practice
virtually dead due to the independence now achieved by most of the
territories under its supervision - or to claim that it establishes a
compulsory trust relationship between a sovereign and its aboriginal
peoples is to abuse the entire philosophy on which it is based. The
trusteeship system only operated to introduce a particular method of
administration under the supervision of the United Nations, with a
view to ultimate independence, only for those 'territories' - and
this means areas not part of the metropolitan land-mass - expressly
placed thereunder and only for the period that the trust agreement
subsists. Thus, no attempt has been made to claim that the people of
West Irian, transferred from Netherlands sovereignty to the
Republic of Indonesia, are in any way to be treated as wards or
cestuis que trust.
Moreover, Chapter XII expressly includes in Article 80 a
reservation to the whole concept 'of trusteeship, ensuring that,
unless specific trusteeship agreements provide otherwise, and
pending the conclusion of such agreements, "nothing in the present
Charter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the
rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of
existing international instruments to which members of the United
Nations may respectively be parties". If any confirmation were
needed of the point made above that the principles underlying the
78a. Supra, note 72.
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trusteeship system, as well as the whole concept of trusteeship as
envisaged by the Charter, have no application to indigenous
peoples, whether minorities or otherwise, this reservation provides
it.
The framers of the Charter were very aware of the fact that the
trusteeship system would be of limited application, and they
introduced in Chapter XI of the Charter a Declaration regarding
Non-Self-Governing Territories - not, it should be noted,
non-self-governing peoples. Article 73 emphasises that there is a
limited territorial scope for this Declaration, which to some extent
affirms that the Members of the United Nations recognize principles
broadly similar to those underlying the trusteeship system for the
future administration of the territories to which the Declaration
refers. The Declaration proclaims that the
Members of the United Nations which have or assume
responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples
have not yet attained a full measure of self-government to
recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of
these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the
obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of
international peace and security established by the present
Charter [- which is paramount -, the well-being of these
territories, and to this end:
(a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples
concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational
advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against
abuses; (b) to develop self-government, to take due account of
the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the
progressive development of their free political institutions,
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and
their peoples and their varying stages of advancement...
This provision is clearly concerned with people in their relation to a
particular territory and envisages a territory which lacks self-
government. It does not refer ngr purport to refer to a people within
an independent state but which, as a group, lacks any of the things
which the Declaration seeks to promote for the inhabitants of
non-metropolitan non-self-governing territories. As if to endorse the
interpretation just given, the Declaration's sole reference to
metropolitan territories has no concern with the inhabitants. It
seems rather to be a paraphrase of Joseph Chamberlain's remark
concerning a commercial trusteeship for the world79:
79. Id. at 60.
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Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in
respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less
than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the
general principle of good neighbourliness, due account being
taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in
social, economic, and commercial matters.
Since the Charter as such has no relevence to the rights of
indigenous peoples, other than the commitment upon members to
promote and encourage respect for fundamental freedoms and
human rights for all, it becomes necessary to see whether the United
Nations has in its practice done anything in the way of conferring
rights or creating a trust relationship in respect of such peoples. In
considering the impact of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, there is no need to become involved in the complex debate
concerning the legal character of General Assembly resolutions8",
for this Declaration has no more significance for such aboriginal
groups as the North American Indians, neither by way of the
conferment of rights, nor by creation of a trust, than it has for any
other person be he a member of a minority or a majority group in
any state. The same comment applies to all the resolutions and other
documents which have been produced by or under the auspices of
the United Nations, save to the extent that any single one or part
thereof may confer specific rights on such people separately and
distinct from their general application to the world at large. Among
the documents which might be of interest from this point of view the
most significant are those on racial discrimination and self-
determination.
The work of the United Nations in the field of discrimination was
originally undertaken by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities established in 1947,
80. See, e.g., Judge Lauterpacht's Separate Opinion on South West Africa Voting
Procedure, [1955] 1. C.J. Rep 90 at 115. See, also F. B. Sloan, The Binding Force
of a Recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations (1948). 25
B.Y. I.I. 1;II Kelsen. The Law of the United Nations (New York: E. A. Praeget,
1951) at 40, 63, 99, 195 - 6, 459, 953ff., M. Virally, La valeurjuridique des
recommendations des organisations internationales, [1956] Annuaire Frangais de
Droit International 66; D. H. N. Johnson, The Effect of Resolutions of the General
Assembly of the United Nations (1955-6), 32 B.Y.I.I. 97 at 111; Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the I.C.J. 1951-4: Questions of
Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure (1958), 34 B.Y.I.I., I at 3; 0. Asamoah,
The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United
Nations (Hague: Nijhoff, 1966).
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only to be abolished in 1951 "persumably because it was reviving
the unwelcome issue of minorities" 81 . Before its demise, however,
the Sub-Commission had said 82:
Protection of minorities is the protection of non-dominant groups
which, while wishing in general for equality of treatment with the
majority, wish for a measure of differential treatment in order to
preserve basic characteristics which they possess and which
distinguish them from the majority of the population. The
protection belongs equally to individuals belonging to such
groups and wishing the same protection. It follows the
differential treatment of such groups or individuals belonging to
such groups is justified when it is exercised in the interest of their
contentment and the welfare of the community as a whole...
If a minority wishes for assimilation and is disbarred, the
question is one of discrimination and should be treated as such.
When eventually in 1963 the General Assembly passed its
resolution on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination
83
it made no reference to trusteeship, self-determination or any such
lofty ideal. Its sole concern was with banning discrimination on the
grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin, and Article 1 of the
International Covention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination of 1965 which entered into force in 196984 merely
widens the scope of the document and reiterates that its operation is
purely on an internal level:
... The term 'racial discrimination' shall mean any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life.
From the point of view of the aboriginal populations of North
America, therefore, and certainly for Canada's Indians, for Canada
has ratified the Convention, the Convention merely aims at securing
for them as well as for all other citizens a right to be treated equally
with every other Canadian. As for the United States, the Convention
81. J. Humphrey, "The World Revolution and Human Rights", in Gotlieb, supra.
note 77 at 147 and 165.
82. UN Doe. E/CN. 4/52 s.V. 1947.
83. Res. 1904 (XVIII).
84. 660 UNTS 195.
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merely spells out at length what recent trends have suggested is the
significance of the Bill of Rights and particularly the Fourteenth
Amendment as understood by the Supreme Court.
Since it is impossible to find any special protection for the North
American aborigine in the work of the United Nations with regard to
minorities or racial discrimination, it is necessary to look at the
position from the standpoint of self-determination. A study of the
history of the United Nations in this field emphasises that this
concept only relates to the inhabitants of a colonial territory, that is
to say a non-metropolitan area not governed by the majority of the
inhabitants. This enables the claim to be made that in addition to
foreign-owned territories, there is no self-determination enjoyed in
such territories as South Africa, even though that country ranks as
an independent state and a member of the United Nations. The true
purpose of the Declaration on self-determination is seen from its
correct title - Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Territories85 . That this has nothing to do
with the rights of a minority in the metropolitan territory - and all
the areas, be they reserves or not, in which the Indians of the United
States or Canada are to be found are part of that territory - is clear
from the following extracts from the Declaration, which nowhere
attempts to define what it means by 'peoples':
. . . Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all
dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the
attainment of their independence, ....
Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting
the movement for independence in Trust and Non-Self-
Governing Territories,
Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end
of colonialism in all its manifestations,
Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents
the development of international economic co-operation, im-
pedes the social, cultural and economic development of
dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal
of universal peace, . ..
Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and
unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;
.. Declares that
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination
and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human
85. Res. 1514 (XV) 1960.
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rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an
impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right of self-determination ...
However
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations.
This last paragraph makes it clear that the Declaration does not
purport to extend to any group within an existing national state
which might feel that it is denied its right to self-determination. The
fact that the right of self-determination appears as Article 1 of the
two International Covenants on human rights86 does not alter the
position one iota. It is impossible to see, in the light of the above,
and of the history of United Nations efforts on behalf of
non-self-governing peoples, recognition of a trust, a ward/guardian
relationship, or any commitment towards aboriginal peoples, in the
statement that "all peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of the right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
Despite the political and ideological brouhaha that has been
attached to the concept of self-determination, one should not
overlook the truth that
. . . the struggle to end colonialism ... swallowed up the
original purpose of co-operation for promotion of human rights.
...The anticolonial atmosphere in the Assembly. . .led to the
injection of anticolonial issues into the human rights covenants.
Self-determination was added to the roster of human rights as an
additional weapon against colonialism although there was no
suggestion that this was a right of the individual, that the
individual could claim against an unrepresentative government,
or that minorities could invoke it to support secession .... 87
Even had the various documents to which reference has been
made given rise to a conception of trusteeship, and even had the
claims for self-determination extended to aboriginal populations,
there might have been good ground for arguing that, looking at the
situation which existed when the relations between the Crown and
the Indians were first established and the concepts of law that then
86. Supra, note 56.
87. L. Henkin, The United Nations and Human Rights (1965), 19 International
Organization 504 at 512-3.
Trusteeship and Canada's Indians 135
prevailed, together with the understanding of the legal consequ-
ences of that relationship, the present concepts could not be applied
retroactively. In so far as these concepts are modem innovations of
an ideological character, they are clearly no more than propaganda
moves in a political game, completely devoid of legal significance.
